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NOTES 
Adequate Protection and Administrative Expense: Toward a 
Uniform System for Awarding Superpriorities 
One purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (Code),1 as amended in 1978, 
was to encourage the reorganization of bankrupt companies and indi-
viduals. 2 The provisions of the Code addressing reorganization are 
becoming increasingly important as the number of bankruptcies, and 
the volume of involved assets, soar.3 Recent bankruptcies result from 
a variety of causes such as large debt portfolios produced by "merger 
madness,"4 potential mass tort liability,5 and avoidance of collective 
bargaining agreements. 6 The reorganizations of these companies, and 
of smaller businesses and personal estates, often depend on the use of 
prepetition assets. 
The Code attempts to protect secured creditors while enabling the 
debtor to use collateral during reorganization. By granting the debtor 
an automatic stay7 of the collection of creditors' claims and concur-
rently guaranteeing creditors "adequate protection" of their collateral, 
1. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-1330 (1988). 
2. Congress recognized that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act had produced negative 
results and few consummated plans. See 135 CoNG. REc. S3549 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. DeConcini) ("The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to encourage the reorganiza· 
tion, and not the liquidation, of financially troubled organization."); 124 CONG. REc. 33990 
(1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (Broader chapter 13 coverage would allow "for greater 
payouts to creditors .••• "); 123 CoNG. REc. 35445, 35446 (1977) (statement of Rep. Edwards) 
(Bankruptcy Act's reorganization chapters offered insufficent power and resulted in "creditors 
[getting] very little."). Representative Edwards noted that under Chapter 11 of the Code, 
[f]or both debtors and creditors, the requirements for a reorganization plan are made more 
flexible, and the court is given the power to confirm the plan even though some creditors do 
not like the plan, so long as the plan meets certain statutory criteria of fairness. This is very 
important. This way creditors get more than if the business went into straight liquidation. 
It also will save more businesses, which will protect jobs and protect public and private 
investors. 
123 CoNG. REc. 35445, 35446 (1977). 
3. Greenwald, The Profits of Doom, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 41; MacLachlan, A Demand 
Spiral for Bankruptcy Specialists, Chi. Trib., Feb. 25, 1990, § 7, at 5; Hornik, Better Watch Out, 
TIME, Feb. 12, 1990, at 48; Donovan, Merger Mania Slump Is a Bankruptcy Boom, Investor's 
Daily, Jan. 26, 1990, at 1. 
4. See Clark & Malabre, Borrowing Binge: Takeover Trend Helps Push Corporate Debt and 
Defaults Upward Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 6, reprinted in 134 CoNG. REc. S3439 
(daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988); Greenwald, supra note 3. 
5. See Address by Hon. Hamilton Fish, Jr., Am. Bankr. Inst. 2d Ann. Mid·Winter Leader-
ship Conf. (Feb. -17, 1988), reprinted in 134 CoNG. REc. 2488 (1988) (remarks by Hon. 
Moorhead). 
6. See 135 CoNG. REc. S3549 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1989) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
7. The automatic stay is provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) and is designed to "stop[] all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1918 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6297 [hereinafter 
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the Code balances competing interests in bankruptcy. The approach 
taken by section 361 of the Code, which identifies three modes of ade-
quate protection, is based both on policy grounds, ensuring creditors 
"the benefit of their bargain," and constitutional grounds, ensuring the 
fifth amendment guarantee of protection of property. 8 
Congress intended the Code to define both the extent of creditor 
protection and the permissible methods of granting such protection. 9 
Although the Code provides for sufficient means of adequate protec-
tion, neither the Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules10 effectively ad-
dresses the procedural steps for obtaining adequate protection. The 
Code also fails to identify the relationship between administrative ex-
penses and adequate protection. These omissions have resulted in dis-
agreement among courts concerning a number of issues and an 
ensuing divergence as to when courts grant adequate protection. 
Some courts question whether adequate protection must be requested 
and authorized by the court in order to qualify for "administrative 
expense superpriority."11 This Note analyzes the policy considera-
tions supporting a requirement of creditor action prior to an adequate 
protection grant. Based on this analysis, this Note suggests revisions 
to the Code and Bankruptcy Rules that would result in an equitable 
balancing of the responsibilities placed on debtors and creditors. 
Part I of this Note reviews the legislative history of relevant Code 
sections and the Code language that pertain to the granting of ade-
quate protection. Section 361 of the Code provides for three types of 
adequate protection. Sections 362, 363, and 364 set out instances 
when actions by the trustee that result in a decrease in the value of a 
secured party's interest require the provision of adequate protection. 
Finally, sections 503 and 507 designate circumstances when prepeti-
HOUSE REPORT]. See infra note 17 for relevant text in Code section providing for automatic 
stay. 
8. Congress noted that the concept of adequate protection 
is derived from the fifth amendment protection of property interests .... The section, and 
the concept of adequate protection, is [sic] based as much on policy grounds as on constitu-
tional grounds. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain .... 
[T]he purpose of [alternate means of protection] is to insure that the secured creditor re-
ceives in value essentially what he bargained for. · 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 339, reprinted at 6295. 
For a discussion of the relationship between the fifth amendment protection against taking of 
property and the concept of adequate protection, see Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Credi-
tors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the 
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1983); Comment, Adequate Protection and the Auto-
matic Stay Under the Bankruptcy Code: Easing Restraints on Debtor Reorganization, 131 U. PA. 
L. REV. 423 (1982); Comment, The Recovery of Opportunity Costs as Just Compensation: A 
Takings Analysis of Adequate Protection, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 953 (1987). 
9. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5,reprinted at 5966 ("[The bill] defines the protections to 
which a secured creditor is entitled, and the means through which the court may grant that 
protection."). 
10. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rules 1001-XlOlO. 
11. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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tion secured creditors are eligible to receive administrative expenses. 
Section 507(b) authorizes allowance of an administrative expense 
claim when the adequate protection provided to a secured creditor 
fails. 
Part II of this Note analyzes the conditions a creditor must satisfy 
to receive adequate protection. This Part argues that a creditor's re-
quest to the court for adequate protection should be enough to invoke 
the right to administrative expense priority and suggests a Code revi-
sion to promote such an outcome. Part III addresses the issue, cur-
rently left unresolved by the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, of 
whether adequate protection must be requested from and approved by 
the court. This Note concludes by proposing an effective system of 
notice and routine court approval that would address the major policy 
concerns of private agreements and could be provided with only minor 
revisions of the Bankruptcy Rules. 
I. BACKGROUND AND STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
Congress enacted section 361 of the Code to ensure that the se-
cured creditor receives the value for which she bargained.12 This Part 
reviews the methods of providing adequate protection and the circum-
stances in which such protection is available to a creditor. Section I.A 
discusses the three methods the Code specifies as forms of adequate 
protection. Section I.B explores the granting of an administrative ex-
pense allowance and its relationship with adequate protection. 
A. Adequate Protection 
Section 361 provides three alternative methods which protect the 
secured creditor by preserving the value of collateral during the 
debtor's reorganization.13 These methods are (1) cash payments; (2) 
12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
13. Section 361 provides in full: 
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of an 
interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by -
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such entity, 
to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 
363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in 
the value of such entity's interest in such property; 
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay, 
use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such 
property; or 
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation allowable 
under section 503(b)(l) of this title as an administrative expense, as will result in the 
realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such 
property. 
11 u.s.c. § 361 (1988). 
This section does not apply in Chapter 12 bankruptcies (bankruptcies of family farmers). 
However, § 1205 establishes four similar methods of adequate protection for those bankruptcies: 
cash payments, additional liens, reasonable rent, and other relief that protects the value of the 
property. 11 U.S.C. § 1205 (1988). 
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additional or replacement liens; and (3) other relief resulting in the 
"indubitable equivalent" of the secured party's interest. Congress did 
not intend these methods to be "exhaustive or exclusive."14 The only 
method of adequate protection disallowed is the "entitle[ment] ... to 
compensation allowable under section 503(b)(l) ... as an administra-
tive expense .... " 15 Section 507(b), however, does allow administra-
tive expenses to be granted when adequate protection fails. 16 
Whereas the adequate protection methods suggested in section 361 
are designed to protect creditors, section 362 allows for an automatic 
stay intended to protect both the creditors and the debtor of a bank-
rupt estate.17 In Chapter 11 cases, the automatic stay of proceedings 
and actions against the debtor is imposed when a debtor files a peti-
tion. Congress noted, when considering the 1978 Code amendments, 
that "a race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents 
[an orderly liquidation procedure]."18 The automatic stay provides a 
debtor with time to reorganize his assets without having to respond to 
financial pressures from individual creditors. Creditors benefit from 
the stay because preferential treatment of "fast acting" creditors is 
avoided and all creditors are treated equally. 
Since the automatic stay disturbs the rights of creditors by disal-
lowing foreclosure, the continuation of the stay is predicated on cer-
tain conditions. Of particular interest to creditors is the Code's 
requirement that adequate protection be given to a creditor whose col-
lateral is depreciating or being consumed. Specifically, section 
14. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 339, reprinted at 6295 (Adequate protection "matters 
are left to case-by-case interpretation .... There are an infinite number of variations possible in 
dealings between debtors and creditors, the law is continually developing, and new ideas are 
continually being iinplemented in this field. The flexibility is important to permit the courts to 
adapt to varying circumstances and changing modes of financing."). 
15. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1988). See supra note 13 for relevant text. 
16. See infra note 31 for text of§ 507(b). Courts disagree on whether administrative ex-
penses can be allowed when adequate protection was never requested. Compare In re Center 
Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1451 n.23 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting § 507(b) compensation, de-
spite debtor's failure to provide adequate protection in the first place, as within the "spirit" of the 
Code) and In re Prime, 37 Bankr. 897 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (denying adequate protection in 
the absence of demand by creditor, but giving administrative expense allowance for depreciation 
of collateral due to use) with In re Advisory Info. & Mgmt. Sys., 50 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 1985) (§ 503 was not intended to provide administrative expenses for use of collateral) and 
In re Briggs Transp. Co., 47 Bankr. 6 (Bania. D. Minn. 1984) (burden on creditors to seek relief 
and demand adequate protection). See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text. 
17. Section 362 provides that a petition filed under§§ 301, 302, or 303 of the Code operates 
as a stay of various acts including: 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of propertY from the estate or to 
exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent 
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this 
title •..• 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)-(a)(5) (1988). 
18. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5787, 5835 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
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362(d)(l) states that relief from the automatic stay must be granted 
"[o]n request of a party in interest" when adequate protection is 
lacking.19 
Section 363 of the Code also requires adequate protection in some 
circumstances. This section regulates the trustee's ability to sell, use, 
or lease the property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of 
business. Under this section, the court can prohibit the nonordinary 
course sale, use, or lease of noncash collateral, or the court can condi-
tion any similar disposition on the provision of adequate protection. 
Such action by the court must occur "at any time, on request of an 
entity that has an interest in [the] property."2° Cash collateral is given 
greater protection in that the sale, use, or lease of the collateral is pro-
hibited unless the secured party consents or the court expressly autho-
rizes the action. 21 Bankruptcy Rule 4001 requires notice and a 
possible hearing prior to the use of any collateral covered by section 
363.22 
Bankruptcy Rule 6004 addresses the procedural requirements gov-
erning the notice of proposed use, sale, or lease of collateral and the 
filing of objections to such actions. 23 A recently proposed amendment 
to Bankruptcy Rule 4001 sets out similar requirements for motions 
filed to prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of property under 
section 363(e).24 Part III of this Note will analyze the adequacy of 
this notice and the effectiveness of the proposed rule. Based on this 
analysis, it is suggested that similar notice and hearing procedures 
should be required for all adequate protection agreements. 
Section 364 governs efforts by the debtor to obtain credit, the third 
situation in which the Code requires adequate protection. A trustee or 
debtor in possession often needs to obtain additional credit in order to 
19. Section 362(d) provides in part: 
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief 
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annul-
ling, modifying, or conditioning such stay -
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such 
party in interest •..• 
11 u.s.c. § 362(d) (1988). 
The Code does not specify what actions constitute a request. There has been disagreement 
among courts over the definition of the term. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. 
20. Section 363(e) provides in full: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity that 
has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by 
the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, 
or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest. 
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988). 
21. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988). 
22. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rule 4001(b). 
23. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rule 6004. 
24. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft 
of Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules, Aug. 1989, at 105, [hereinafter Proposed 
Rules] reprinted in 880 F.2d CLXXIV, CCCIII (West's Advanced Rptr., Sept. 18, 1989). 
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reorganize the business and estate. If unsecured credit is not available, 
the court can authorize senior or equal liens on property subject to 
prepetition liens. Section 364 authorizes senior or equal liens only af-
ter adequate protection has been secured for the other lienholders of 
the collateral property.25 Nothing in section 364 suggests that credi-
tors have a duty to request adequate protection in these instances. 
Rather the section implies that adequate protection must be provided 
before senior or equal liens on the property may be grante4.26 Bank-
ruptcy Rule 4001 sets out time limits, filing requirements, and neces-
sary notice service for motions to obtain credit. 27 
In sum, section 361 suggests three ways in which adequate protec-
tion may be provided when reorganization of the bankrupt estate seri-
ously impairs a secured creditor's collateral. Sections 362, 363, and 
364 indicate certain instances where adequate protection is explicitly 
required due to an impairment of the collateral. Though the methods 
of adequate protection provided in section 361 are not exclusive, Con-
gress explicitly excluded the granting of adequate protection through 
administrative expense priority. The one exception to this exclusion is 
provided by section 507, which allows administrative expense priority 
when the original adequate protection provided to a secured creditor 
fails. 
B. Administrative Expenses _ 
Section 507 sets out the priority_ of claims against a bankrupt es-
tate. Administrative expenses are given the highest priority. These 
expenses, defined in section 503(b ), include "the actual, necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving the estate."28 Originally, the drafters 
25. Section 364(d)(l) provides in full: 
The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring 
of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only 
if-
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and 
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of 
the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be granted. 
11 u.s.c. § 364(d)(l) (1988). 
26. The wording of § 364 - "only if . . . there is adequate protection" - suggests that 
adequate protection under its provision is automatic. By contrast, §§ 362 and 363 both contain 
wording which indicates that adequate protection will be provided only on the request of the 
creditor. Neither the automatic stay nor the use, sale, or lease of noncash collateral under these 
sections is conditioned on the provision of adequate protection. See supra notes 17, 19, 20, and 
25 for relevant text of statutes. 
27. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c). 
28. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988). Collier states that under § 503(b) 
[p]ermissible expenses may include the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving 
the estate, such as wages, salaries or commissions for services rendered after the order for 
relief; any taxes on, measured by, or withheld from such wages, salaries or commissions •.•• 
To some extent, •.. what constitute actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving 
an estate is open to judicial construction. 
2 CoLLIER'S BANKRUPTCY MANuAL 1J 503.03 (3d ed. 1989). 
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of the Code included administrative expense priority as a method of 
adequate protection. Provision for this method of adequate protection 
was eventually deleted from section 361 because the drafters became 
concerned that too often the assets would be inadequate to meet all the 
administrative expense claims.29 To ensure that administrative ex-
penses would not be used as a method of adequate protection by debt-
ors, section 361(c) specifically excludes section 503(b)(l) 
compensation as a form of adequate protection. 
In the final version of section 361, Congress still wished to ensure 
protection for those creditors who received adequate protection that 
later proved to be insufficient. 30 To that end, Congress added section 
507(b) which provides that when adequate protection of a prepetition 
secured party's interest fails, the first priority afforded to postpetition 
administrative expenses can be superseded. Section 507(b) states that 
when a creditor still has an administrative expense claim despite the 
provision of adequate protection, that "creditor's claim ... shall have 
priority over every other claim allowable."31 This type of claim arises, 
for example, when payments agreed upon as adequate protection are 
not made, or when adequate protection does not tum out to be the 
"indubitable equivalent." The priority granted by section 507(b) is 
commonly called a superpriority.32 
The allowability of administrative expenses for prepetition secured 
creditors is a confused issue and the relationship between adequate 
protection and administrative expenses remains unclear. As one court 
has noted, the confusion is due to the tension "between the expenses 
allowed in § 507(b), as defined in § 507(a)(l), and the prohibitions 
found in § 361(3)."33 The first step in understanding this tension is 
determining when adequate protection may be granted, either through 
the methods in section 361 or through an allowance of administrative 
expenses. 
29. 124 CoNG. REc. 32350, 32395 (1978) (statement of Hon. Don Edwards, Chair. of the 
SubComm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary upon intro· 
ducing the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 8200) [hereinafter Edwards 
Statement]. 
30. Id. at 32395. 
31. Section 507(b) provides in full: 
If the trustee, under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate protection of the 
interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if, notwith· 
standing such protection, such creditor has a claim allowable under subsection (a)(l) of this 
section arising from the stay of action against such property under section 362 of this title, 
from the use, sale, or lease of such property under section 363 of this title, or from the 
granting of a lien under section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim under such 
subsection shall have priority over every other claim allowable under such subsection. 
11 u.s.c. § 507(b) (1988). 
32. See 2 CoLLIER'S BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 11 507.08 (3d ed. 1989).' 
33. In re Smith, 75 Bankr. 365, 369 (W.D. Va. 1987). 
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II. ADEQUATE PROTECTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
A creditor may be awarded adequate protection through the sec-
tion 361 methods and, if adequate protection proves inadequate to sat-
isfy the creditor's claim, a creditor may gain additional protection 
through a11owance of administrative expenses as provided in section 
507(b). Section II.A discusses the requirements a creditor must meet 
to receive adequate protection pursuant to sections 362, 363, and 364. 
In most cases, the creditor must take affirmative steps to receive ade-
quate protection; section 364 presents the only exception to this rule. 
Section II.B discusses whether the creditor is entitled to section 507(a) 
expenses directly and explores the relationship between the restriction 
of administrative expenses as a form of adequate protection and the 
grant of such expenses under 507(b). 
A. Obtaining Adequate Protection Under Sections 362, 363, 
and 364 
As discussed in Part I, adequate protection, as described in section 
361, must be granted when required under sections 362, 363, and 364. 
Unquestionably, adequate protection is available through these sec-
tions and is in some cases obligatory. In a few situations, however, the 
application of the Code with respect to a creditor's claim has unfairly 
penalized the creditor.34 To understand these problems properly, it is 
necessary first to understand the requirements sections 362-364 place 
on creditors and the justifications for those requirements. The process 
a creditor must follow varies slightly with each of the Code sections 
requiring adequate protection. 
Adequate protection may be granted by the court under section 
362 if relief from the automatic stay is denied. The wording of section 
362 makes it clear that the debtor is under no duty to provide ade-
quate protection except "[o]n request of a party in interest."35 As 
noted by Collier, this language places the burden of initiating a motion 
for relief from stay on the "party affected."36 Once the creditor makes 
such a request, the debtor must propose a mode of protection that 
protects the creditor from any decline in the value of her collateral. 37 
34. See In re James B. Downing & Co., 94 Ban1cr. SIS (Ban1cr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (administra-
tive expense priority denied when early adequate protection request found moot); see also In re 
Smith, 7S Bankr. 36S (W.D. Va. 1987) (denial of administrative expense priority despite early 
adequate protection request); infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
3S. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988); see supra note 19 for relevant text. 
36. 1 CoLLIER'S BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 11 362.06, at 362-4S (3d ed. 1989). The request for 
relief should include an alternative motion for adequate protection in case the court denies such 
relief. 
37. Section 362(g) states: 
In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from the stay of 
any act under subsection (a) of this section -
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's 
equity in property; and 
2176 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:2168 
The court hears arguments only if the parties cannot agree on what 
constitutes adequate protection. 
Section 362's requirement that a secured creditor request adequate 
protection is justified on policy grounds. The stay is automatic upon 
the filing of either a voluntary or involuntary petition for relief under 
the Code. 38 Each creditor receives notice of the creditors' meeting and 
thus has sufficient warning that her collateral may be affected and that 
a request for relief from stay may be desirable. 39 The language of sec-
tion 362 suggests that the debtor may continue using the collateral 
until a request for adequate protection is made.40 Forcing the debtor 
to provide adequate protection to all creditors automatically might 
hinder the debtor's reorganization ability since he constantly would 
have to review all creditors' collateral positions. An automatic pre-
sumption of adequate protection would conflict with the Code's policy 
of supporting reorganization and favoring postpetition lenders. In-
stead, by holding the prepetition creditor to some level of diligence 
and responsibility in protecting her collateral, the debtor can work to-
wards a successful reorganization by using the collateral until ade-
quate protection is requested.41 The provision of adequate protection 
and the valuation of assets is often disputed by the creditor and thus 
requires negotiation and, sometimes, court determination. The re-
quest requirement avoids delays associated with negotiations until a 
creditor actually asks for adequate protection. In view of the benefits, 
requiring the creditor to request adequate protection does not seem 
unduly burdensome. 
The procedure for obtaining adequate protection under section 363 
is similar to that just outlined for section 362. Again the wording of 
the statute clearly requires a "request [from] an entity that has an in-
terest in property used, sold, or leased" to trigger the required protec-
tion. 42 Upon a request by the creditor, the bankruptcy court will 
condition the sale, use, or lease of the collateral on the provision of 
adequate protection. The creditor receives notice under Bankruptcy 
Rule 6004 of a proposed disposition of property. 43 This rule ensures 
that the creditor is informed of any events under section 363 that 
might affect the value of the collateral. As under section 362, it is 
appropriate to require the creditor to request adequate protection in 
order to receive it.44 If the creditor does not respond to the notice of 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues. 
11 u.s.c. § 362(g) (1988). 
38. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 342 (1988); 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rule 2002. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988); see supra note 19 for relevant text. 
41. See infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text. 
42. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988); see supra note 20 for relevant text. 
43. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rule 6004. 
44. See infra Part III. 
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sale, use, or lease of property, the debtor should be able to make the 
planned disposition without first determining the creditor's position 
with respect to collateral. To require more on the part of the debtor 
could seriously delay reorganization activities while every secured 
creditor's collateral position was being determined. Notice leaves the 
monitoring activities to the creditor whose collateral is affected. 
As opposed to the provisions in sections 362 and 363, section 364 
does not appear to require affirmative creditor action to ensure ade-
quate protection when senior or equal liens are granted on collateral.45 
The legislative history of section 364 indicate that the debtor has an 
affirmative duty to provide adequate protection before senior or equal 
liens may be attached to the collateral. 46 This automatic provision of 
adequate protection would be necessary if a creditor were unaware 
that additional liens were being placed on her collateral and that ade-
quate protection might be necessary. In 1987, however, Bankruptcy 
Rule 4001 was amended to require notice of all additional liens. After 
the amendment, any motion for additional credit made under section 
364 should include a description of the collateral.47 This requirement 
should provide sufficient notice to all creditors, making an automatic 
grant of adequate protection less warranted. 
An issue related to the type of request necessary for adequate pro-
tection is the question of when such a request should be made. 
Neither section 362 nor section 363 indicates the proper timing of an 
adequate protection request. Furthermore, nothing in any of the ade-
quate protection sections suggests that a creditor waives adequate pro-
tection by failing to make a request within a certain time period. 
However, in order to prevent last minute requests for adequate protec-
tion covering postpetition loss in collateral, several courts have held 
that the adequate protection provided for a creditor should be mea-
sured from the date the creditor formally requests such protection 
from the court. 48 
A few courts disagree with this position and set other events as the 
benchmark of damages.49 The date-of-request method provides full 
protection to a diligent creditor and minimizes the chance that credi-
45. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
46. The House Committee on the Judiciary noted when drafting § 364: 
The court may authorize such a superpriority only if the trustee is otherwise unable to 
obtain credit, and if there is adequate protection of the original lien holder's interest. 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 347, reprinted at 6303. 
47. Notes of A!Ivisory Committee on Rules - 1987 Amendment, Bankruptcy Rule 4001, 
reprinted in 11 U.S.C. app. at 257-58. 
48. E.g., In re Ritz-Carlton ofD.C., Inc., 98 Banlcr. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Wilson, 
70 Banlcr. 46, 48 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1987); In re Haiflich, 63 Banlcr. 314, 317 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 
1986). See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these cases. 
49. Not all courts require a formal request for adequate protection. The court in Hinckley 
measured depreciation from the date the creditor informed the debtor that he would be seeking 
adequate protection. In re Hinckley, 40 Banlcr. 679, 681-82 (Banlcr. D. Utah 1984). 
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tors, waiting until the eve of confirmation to request adequate protec-
tion, will successfully veto any plan. 50 Even if creditors make late 
requests, measuring the loss to collateral from the date of formal re-
quest lowers the chance that the award would be fatal to a confirma-
tion plan. A third position, that failure to request adequate protection 
results in a waiver of administrative expense claims, is discussed in 
section 11.B below. 
Although the language of sections 362, 363, and 364 is clear re-
garding a creditor's duty to ask for adequate protection, confusion has 
arisen concerning several related issues. First, the relationship be-
tween the section 361 restrictions on providing adequate protection 
through granting administrative expense status and the language of 
section 507(b), which grants that same status when adequate protec-
tion fails, remains unclear. Second, no definite agreement has been 
reached on what creditor action is sufficient to entitle a creditor to 
section 507(b) expenses. The next section argues that the submission 
of an adequate protection request is enough to entitle the creditor to 
superpriority status for any amount not adequately protected. 
B. Administrative Expenses Under Section 507 
The method of providing adequate protection through allowance 
of administrative expenses and the responsibility of the creditor in 
claiming such expenses are not clear. Section 361 excludes adminis-
trative expenses as an acceptable method of adequate protection.51 
Thus, some courts have held that administrative expense priority is 
available only under section 507(b) and only to those creditors whose 
previously provided adequate protection has proved deficient.52 This 
rule can produce harsh results which do not appear necessary to ad-
vance the policy issues adequate protection and limitation of adminis-
trative expense attempt to address. 
This section first presents a unique method of claiming adequate 
protection found valid in In re Prime, Inc. 53 This method circumvents 
many of the adequate protection limitations, and conflicts with legisla-
tive intent and policy goals. Second, this section focuses on cases illus-
trating the problems which occur when courts require a grant of 
adequate protection prior to an administrative expense allowance. 
These cases suggest that an amendment to section 507(b) is necessary 
to balance more properly the need to encourage diligence by creditors 
with the desire not to penalize those creditors whose request for ade-
quate protection is delayed or denied. 
50. See infra notes 63, 75 and accompanying text. 
51. Edwards Statement, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
52. In re James B. Downing & Co., 94 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Kain, 86 
Bankr. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988); In re Smith, 75 Bankr. 365 (W.D. Va. 1987). 
53. 37 Bankr. 897 (Bankr. M.D. Mo. 1984). 
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1. Claims for Administrative Expenses Under Section 503 
Traditional requests for allowance of claims for administrative ex-
penses by prepetition creditors are made under section 507(b). The 
bankruptcy court then grants an administrative expense allowance if 
the adequate protection originally provided has failed. Some creditors 
have argued that they are entitled to allowance of administrative ex-
penses directly under section 507(a)(l)54 because the use of collateral 
constitutes one of the "necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate."55 • 
At least one court has responded favorably to these arguments, 
awarding creditors priority for administrative expense claims in order 
to compensate for a decline in the value of their collateral even though 
they had failed to ask previously for adequate protection. The court in 
In re Prime, Inc. 56 granted an administrative expense allowance to a 
creditor based on the belief that the use of collateral resulted in a bene-
fit to the estate. 
During reorganization, the debtor in Prime used tractors and 
trucks that were assigned as collateral for loans from two creditors. 
Neither creditor made any request for adequate protection following 
the debtor's bankruptcy petition. After twenty- one months, the credi-
tors sought to collect administrative expenses for the depreciation re-
sulting from wear and tear on the collateral. The creditors requested 
priority for administrative expense only under section 503(b)(l)(A) 
and not section 507(b) superpriority expense.57 The creditors argued 
they were entitled to an administrative expense allowance since use of 
the equipment amounted to one of the "actual, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving the estate."58 The court held that the creditors 
were entitled to some administrative allowance due to their contribu-
tion of the "value of their collateral over the period of use."59 The 
court recognized that section 507(b) expenses were not allowable since 
no request for adequate protection was made, but its finding of postpe-
tition contribution circumvented that section's requirements. 60 
The Code does not explicitly prohibit the holding in Prime -
granting section 503 administrative expense priority for collateral de-
preciation is not specifically excluded. In fact, whenever courts award 
a 507(b) administrative expense superpriority for collateral deprecia-
54. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(l) (1988). 
55. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988). 
56. 37 Banlcr. 897 (Banlcr. W.D. Mo. 1984). 
57. The creditors in Prime were not entitled to a superpriority expense because such a rem-
edy is available only where adequate protection fails; here, no adequate protection had been 
granted. 37 Bankr. at 899. 
58. 37 Bankr. at 898 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988)). 
59. 37 Bankr. at 898-99. 
60. 37 Banlcr. at 899. 
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tion, they must characterize that depreciation as an allowable 503(b) 
expense.61 Section 507(b) allows administrative expense superpriority 
when two conditions are met: (1) adequate protection has been pro-
vided, and (2) notwithstanding such provision, a claim exists for ad-
ministrative expense as defined in section 503(b ). Congress recognized 
that section 507(b) applies specifically when adequate protection 
fails.62 
The tension between the Code sections becomes obvious in Prime 
where the creditors were not formally requesting adequate protection 
but rather an expense recovery for the use of equipment. Prime sug-
gests that since a postpetition creditor furnishing assets would be paid, 
prepetition creditors who make essentially the same contribution by 
allowing their collateral to be used during reorganization should also 
be compensated. A bankruptcy court in Minnesota rejected this argu-
ment in In re Briggs Transportation Co. 63 The court noted that 
"[e]ven if [the debtor] had benefited, it does not necessarily follow that 
[the debtor] has incurred an expense."64 The court in In re Advisory 
Information & Management Systems, Inc. followed this reasoning, re-
jected the Prime holding, and stated that a secured creditor "is not 
contributing anything to the estate by sitting back and 'allowing' a 
debtor-in-possession to use collateral which it already owns and has a 
statutory right to use."65 
Despite the creditors' arguments above, the Prime holding conflicts 
with the intent and policies of the Code. Even if the debtor does re-
ceive a benefit from using the collateral, as required by section 503, the 
Code should be read to encourage early adequate protection requests 
and preclude administrative expense allowances or priority for prepeti-
tion creditors except under section 507(b). The drafters clearly in-
tended prepetition creditors to receive compensation only through the 
adequate protection methods in section 361, which excludes a section 
507(a), and therefore a section 503, administrative expense.66 The 
methods mentioned in section 361 were meant specifically to address 
various types of secured creditors. The first method, cash payments, 
was designed to "compensate for the expected decrease in value of the 
opposing entity's interest ... for example ... deprecia[tion] at a rela-
61. Although depreciation is recognized as an expense for income statement purposes, it in 
fact is viewed as a "cost recovery" or prepaid expense. l.R.C. § 168 (1988). This view of depre· 
ciation is difficult to reconcile with the traditional reorganization-accorded expenses and costs 
under § 503, such as manufacturing costs, salaries, and attorneys' fees. 
62. Edwards Statement, supra note 29, at 32398. 
63. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 47 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
64. 47 Bankr. at 7. 
65. 50 Bankr. 627, 630 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). It should be noted that a superpriority 
allowance is in fact based on the recognition that a creditor has an allowable § 503 claim which 
has been inadequately protected, not on whether an expense occurred. 
66. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988); see supra note 13 for relevant text. 
June 1990] Note - Administrative Expense Priority 2181 
tively fixed rate."67 The second method provides similar compensa-
tion through an interest in additional property. Because of the 
uncertainty that the estate would be sufficient to pay the expenses in 
full, Congress deleted the provision of adequate protection through 
administrative expense priority.68 Only through the exception pro-
vided in section 507(b) is such an expense priority granted. Congress 
must have viewed the methods of section 361 as adequate. 
In addition to the lack of congressional intent, several courts have 
recognized policy-based problems present in the reasoning in Prime. 
The principal argument present in In re Advisory & Management Sys-
tems, Inc. 69 for denying an administrative expense recovery under sec-
tion 503(a)(l) is based on the policies underlying section 503 and its 
predecessor, section 64a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act.70 These policies 
include facilitating rehabilitation71 and encouraging third parties to 
supply goods and services. Providing first priority to postpetition 
creditors induces extension of credit, enabling the debtor to continue 
operations. Prepetition creditors benefit from this priority status in 
that the debtor's continued operation and chance for rehabilitation im-
prove the likelihood of full payment. The court in In re Mammoth 
Mart, Inc. 72 summed up these policies in holding that, because the 
trustee or debtor in possession acts as a distinct entity operation for 
the benefit of prepetition creditors, "fairness requires that any claims 
incident to the debtor-in-possession's operation . . . be paid before 
those of creditors for whose benefit the continued operation of the 
business was allowed. " 73 Some courts, recognizing the importance of 
these policies, have held that giving preference to claims clearly not 
intended to be covered by section 503(a) must be avoided and the stat-
ute read narrowly.74 By reading the statute narrowly, prepetition 
creditors would become ineligible for administrative expense priority. 
A second policy-based argument, made by the court in In re Briggs 
Transportation, concerns the effect an allowance of administrative ex-
penses under section 507(a)(l) would have on bankruptcy proceed-
ings. 75 The court expressed concern that creditors, after taking no 
67. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 54, reprinted at 5840. 
68. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 54, reprinted at 5840. 
69. 50 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
70. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(l), 52 Stat. 874 (1938) (repealed 1978). 
71. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
72. 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1976). 
73. 536 F.2d at 954. 
74. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 658 F.2d 1149, 1163 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re James B. Downing & Co., 94 Bankr. 515, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1988); In re Greater Kansas City Transp., Inc., 71 Bankr. 865, 872-73 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In 
re White Motor Corp., 64 Bankr. 586, 593 (N.D. Ohio 1986). 
75. The court in In re Briggs Transportation stated: 
A creditor •.. could .•. do nothing regarding seeking relief from the automatic stay or 
requesting adequate protection for a long period of time including up until a plan was pro-
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action for an extended period, could request allowance for administra-
tive expenses on the eve of confirmation of the reorganization. This 
action could effectively veto any plan since administrative expenses 
must ordinarily be paid in full on the date of confirmation. Requiring 
a creditor to request adequate protection prior to being eligible for 
administrative expense treatment reduces this possibility. When ade-
quate protection is requested immediately before confirmation, the 
creditor should at most be eligible for protection from the date of re-
quest to the court. 76 The amount of entitlement should therefore be 
minimal and not seriously affect the plan confirmation process. 
As is apparent, Congress designed adequate protection to make 
certain that secured "creditors [are not] deprived of the benefit of their 
bargain."77 Since Congress has provided adequate protection to 
prepetition creditors, administrative expense allowance should not be 
granted except under section 507(b). As noted in Advisory Informa-
tion, the possibility of dealing with a bankrupt debtor is "one of the 
many considerations a lender must evaluate at the time of the original 
loan. "78 Since the creditor is not electing to do postpetition business 
with the debtor, she should not be allowed administrative expense pri-
ority that Congress designed to encourage such election. 
2. Grants of Administrative Expenses Under Section 507(b) 
If creditors are not eligible for administrative expense priority 
through sections 507(a)(l) or 503(a), they can look only to section 
507(b). Most courts have held, based on the statutory language, that 
administrative expense allowances are available to prepetition credi-
tors only when the trustee has provided adequate protection that later 
proves deficient. 79 A strict reading of this language can produce ineq-
uitable results when a request for adequate protection is made but the 
actual provision of adequate protection is delayed or ignored. so Since 
the only prerequisite to the grant of adequate protection under sec-
tions 362 and 363 is the filing of an appropriate request, and under 
section 364 such protection is a prerequisite to the grant of a superior 
or equal lien, the availability of administrative expense priority should 
posed. Then long into the case, the creditors could step forward, make requests for payment 
of administrative expense which would at that point be a sum which the debtor would be 
unable to pay. Since § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires that all of these priority administrative ex-
penses be paid in full on the effective date of confirmation, such creditors could effectively 
veto any plan. 
47 Bankr. 6, 8 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
76. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra note 8. 
78. 50 Bankr. 627, 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
79. See supra note 46. The court in In re Callister limited the claims that can be made when 
adequate protection is deficient. Allowances were granted only for value unexpectedly or un-
foreseeably lost over the course of the case. 15 Bankr. 521, 528 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
80. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
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be dependent on the creditors' taldng the proper actions. Priority 
should not depend on the actual granting of adequate protection. 
Many of the policy arguments for requiring a grant of adequate pro-
tection also support an amendment to section 507(b) to require only 
that the creditor have first requested adequate protection. 
This section analyzes the application of section 507(b) in its cur-
rent form and its production of inequitable results. First, it reviews 
several cases revealing the problems which the statutory language can 
generate. Second, the section proposes an amendment to section 
507(b) that should reduce its potential unfairness. 
Courts considering administrative expense claims under section 
507(b) traditionally require the creditor to meet two criteria: (1) that 
adequate protection was provided by the trustee, and (2) that it proved 
deficient. These courts refuse to give superpriority to creditors who 
fail to meet both requirements. 81 A refusal, based solely on the fact 
adequate protection was not provided, produces particularly unfair re-
sults for creditors whose collateral has been subject to senior or equal 
liens under section 364. These creditors have no duty to request ade-
quate protection and should not be penalized for a debtor's failure to 
provide such protection. Inequitable outcomes also result in cases 
where adequate protection is not provided despite affirmative acts 
taken by the creditor for the purpose of obtaining protection. 
In several cases the application of the above criteria has produced 
harsh results for creditors who were diligent in requesting adequate 
protection but who did not receive" protection due to delay or court 
action. The court in In re Smith based its denial of administrative 
expense partially on the fact that adequate protection had not been 
provided. 82 The creditors had requested adequate protection seven 
months after the petition was filed because the debtor's financial con-
dition continued to deteriorate. No order was filed until eighteen 
months later, after a second adequate protection request. In the even-
tual order the bankruptcy court judge found that, while the creditors 
were entitled to adequate protection, they would be afforded priority 
only under section 507(a)(l) since no assets were available to provide 
protection. The district court held section 507(a)(l) administrative ex-
penses were not allowable at least in part because adequate protection 
had not been granted. 83 A similar outcome occurred in In re James B. 
Downing & Co. where the bankruptcy court denied priority because 
the creditors' earlier motion for adequate protection had been dis-
81. See In re James B. Downing & Co., 94 Banlcr. 515 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Smith, 
75 Bankr. 365 (W.D. Va. 1987). 
82. 75 Banlcr. 365, 369 (W.D. Va. 1987) (request for§ 507(b) administrative expense priority 
denied because adequate protection not previously provided and because requested expenses 
could not be deemed administrative expenses). 
83. 75 Bankr. at 369. 
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missed as moot. 84 
Both decisions illustrate a major problem arising from a strict stat-
utory interpretation of section 507(b). In Downing and Smith the 
creditors had acted diligently in requesting adequate protection, but 
protection was denied due to judicial determination or delay and the 
creditor became ineligible for administrative expenses. A creditor 
should not be so penalized when she has fulfilled her duty to request 
protection. The section 507(b) requirement of previous adequate pro-
tection works to ensure that creditors do not wait until late in a reor-
ganization case and then claim administrative expenses back to the 
date of the petition. But in a case where a creditor has requested ade-
quate protection, especially where she actually had filed a motion for 
protection, the debtor has adequate notice that the creditor must be 
compensated for any loss in collateral prior to confirmation. Such 
compensation must be arranged prior to confirmation. 
Requiring adequate protection actually to be provided also pro-
duces an unfair result when the claim for administrative expenses is 
the result of an additional lien granted under section 364. Here the 
creditor need not request adequate protection since the right to such 
protection is a prerequisite to the granting of a senior or equal lien. 
This provides a unique situation under section 507(b), since adequate 
protection is the responsibility of the debtor. This dilemma was con-
fronted in In re Center Wholesale, Inc. 85 In Center Wholesale the 
bankruptcy judge had signed a collateral order which, in effect, gave a 
postpetition creditor a senior lien on collateral assigned to a prepeti-
tion creditor. On appeal, the circuit judge remanded and suggested 
the bankruptcy court grant the prepetition creditor a superpriority 
under 507(b). In a footnote the judge noted the usual application of 
section 507(b) to situations when adequate protection fails, but 
"although not literally within the provisions of section 507, [the credi-
tor's] injury is clearly within its spirit."86 This holding appears equita-
ble because the creditor should not be penalized for the debtor's failure 
to provide adequate protection when the debtor had an affirmative 
duty to do so. 
84. 94 Banlcr. 515 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1988). 
85. 759 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1985). 
86. The footnote reads in its entirety: 
Section 507(b) addresses the situation where the debtor in possession initially provides pro-
tection that, after the fact, turns out to be inadequate. In [this] case, [the debtor] never 
provided protection in the first place. Therefore, although not literally within the provisions 
of section 507, [the creditor's] injury is clearly within its spirit and deserves to be remedied 
by granting its claim a superpriority. Cf. In re Prime, 35 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1984) (secured creditor is entitled to a superpriority under section 507(b) even though 
debtor had previously entered into a settlement with the creditor instead of proving to the 
court that debtor could adequately protect the creditor's interest). 
759 F.2d at 1451 n.23. As discussed, the outcome of Center Wholesale is not justified under the 
reasoning of Prime. It is justified based on the debtor's duty to provide adequate protection. 
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All three of the above cases evidence the problems produced by 
strict application of the current wording of section 507(b). While the 
requirement that adequate protection be provided before a superpri-
ority will be granted ensures creditor diligence and effective reorgani-
zation, these purposes can also be addressed by requiring only a 
request prior to a section 507(b) allowance. The current wording 
helps to prevent late requests for expenses from interfering seriously 
with confirmation of a pending plan. The previous provision of ade-
quate protection guarantees that the debtor in possession or trustee is 
aware an administrative expense allowance may be necessary to pro-
tect the creditor fully. If a creditor requests adequate protection, how-
ever, and the request is subsequently denied, delayed, or ignored, the 
debtor still has been put on notice of the creditor's claims and con-
cerns. It should therefore be the debtor~s responsibility to respond to 
that claim, whether directly through adequate protection or through 
the eventual allowance of administrative expenses. 
Two potential problems may result from a change in the language 
of section 507(b) to require a mere request on the part of the creditor. 
First, requests for adequate protection may increase as creditors try to 
guarantee some type of protection against a decline in the value of 
their collateral. This type of action could be reduced if the court later 
recognized only good faith adequate protection requests that were ac-
tively pursued. Creditors who file a request, with no intention of pur-
suing the claim, are taking the risk that the estate will be inadequate to 
permit recovery. Second, requiring a request may increase litigation 
immediately prior to reorganization as the debtor and creditor try to 
determine the value of the collateral. These valuation disputes would 
have been addressed if the adequate protection had not been delayed 
or ignored. The number of disputes could be reduced by requiring 
some type of valuation to accompany the request for adequate protec-
tion and by recognizing the values contained in motions to use or dis-
pose of property and motions to obtain credit. The creditor is entitled 
to some type of protection; an increase in court costs should not in-
fringe on this entitlement. 
In order to reflect the debtor's responsibility properly, section 
507(b) should be amended to require the creditor only to take the af-
firmative steps specified by sections 362, 363, and 364. 87 This would 
force the creditor to request adequate protection prior to the use, sale, 
87. After amendment, section 507(b) might read: 
If the court, under section 362 or 363, has received a request for adequate protection of the 
interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on the property of the debtor, or under 
section 364, has granted a lien on property on which an entity holds a superior lien, and if, 
notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a claim allowable under subsection (a)(l) 
of this section arising from the stay of action against such property under section 362 of this 
title, from the use, sale, or lease of such property under section 363 of this title, or from the 
granting of a lien under section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim under such 
subsection shall have priority over every other claim allowable under such subsection. 
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or lease of the collateral, or when seeking relief from the automatic 
stay. Whether adequate protection was ever provided should not be 
an issue, except in determining damages. When an additional lien on 
collateral has been granted, the creditor should be entitled to an ad-
ministrative expense allowance regardless of whether adequate protec-
tion was ever requested. By amending the language of section 507(b), 
Congress not only would guarantee that the debtor receives the protec-
tions afforded by section 507(b), but would also avoid unfairly penaliz-
ing the creditor for court actions beyond her control. 88 
Before being entitled to any administrative expense allowance, a 
creditor must meet certain procedural requirements. Some dispute ex-
ists over what actions constitute the "provision" of adequate protec-
tion as required by the language in the current section 507(b). Under 
the suggested amendment, it would be necessary to determine what 
procedural steps establish the existence of an adequate protection 
request. 
Ill. PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR OBTAINING ADEQUATE 
PROTECTION 
In order for a creditor to be entitled to an administrative expense 
allowance under current Code provisions, it must be determined that 
adequate protection has been "provided" previously. It is unclear 
what procedural actions must be taken in order for the adequate pro-
tection agreement to be considered valid and enforceable. In order for 
adequate protection and administrative expense superpriorities to be 
administered efficiently, a concrete and uniform system for providing 
such relief must be established. If the amendment to section 507(b) 
suggested in Part II of this Note is adopted, it would be necessary to 
adopt a similar definition or system to determine when an adequate 
protection request has been made. Section III.A analyzes the current 
procedural mechanisms and the court decisions relating to the provi-
sion of adequate protection. Section 111.B reviews current case law 
concerning adequate protection requests and its application if Code 
88. A creditor may also have a cause of action based on the fifth amendment. If a delay on 
the part of the court results in a failure to give adequate protection, and administrative expense 
priority is then denied, a constitutional claim may be available based on the taking of property 
without due process. Congress recognized that a debtor, in proposing an adequate protection 
plan, was 
not intended to be confined strictly to the constitutional protection required, however. The 
section, and the concept of adequate protection, is based as much on policy grounds as on 
constitutional grounds. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bar-
gain. There may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured creditor an absolute 
right to his bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the bankruptcy laws. 
Thus, this section recognizes the availability of alternate means of protecting a secured cred-
itor's interest. Though the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of the 
section is to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained 
for. 
HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 339, reprinted at 6295. 
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section 507(b) was amended to require only adequate protection re-
quests. This Part proposes that an adequate protection request be rec-
ognized only when it is made to the court and notice is given to other 
creditors. 
A. Provisions of Adequate Protection and Rule 4001 
Presently, courts disagree on whether adequate protection agree-
ments must be court approved and notice given to other creditors, or, 
alternatively, whether consensual agreements and stipulations between 
a creditor and debtor are automatically enforceable. 89 The Code itself 
provides little assistance in determining whether court approval is nec-
essary. 90 Bankruptcy Rule 4001, including recently proposed amend-
ments, provides a procedural mechanism the debtor may follow when 
seeking court approval for an adequate protection agreement.91 A 
problem remains, however, because the rule does not require a debtor 
to provide notice or to seek court approval for all agreements. Thus 
the question of the enforceability and validity of some consensual 
agreements remains. Section III.A.1 reviews both the current and 
proposed versions of rule 4001 and explains their provisions. Section 
111.A.2 considers several policy concerns regarding consensual agree-
89. Compare In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co., 859 F.2d 137 (lOtli Cir. 1988) (failure to obtain 
court approval of an agreement held not fatal to a claim) and In re Cheatham, 91 Bankr. 382 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988) (superpriority expense allowed when consensual adequate protection 
agreement filed) with In re B & W Tractor Co., 38 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (agree-
ments not court approved subjected to close scrutiny). 
90. The Code does not specifically mention the necessity of court approval for any of the 
adequate protection methods suggested in§ 361. An argument that the Code does in fact require 
court approval of adequate protection agreements, however, is presented in a footnote in In re 
Engle. The footnote reads in full: 
Under § 549 of the banlcruptcy code, the Trustee may avoid post-petition transfers of prop-
erty of the estate where such transfers are "not authorized under this title or by the court." 
11 U.S.C.A. § 549(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1987). An interesting question arises whether adequate 
protection payments made postpetition require court approval or are "authorized under this 
title" by §§ 361 and 362(d). The official comments to § 362 suggest that court involvement 
in adequate protection arrangements should be minimal. In fact, the comments suggest that 
court involvement should be limited to cases where the adequate protection negotiations fail 
and the creditor seeks relief from the stay under § 362. The comment states: "This section 
specifies means by which adequate protection may be provided but, to avoid placing the 
court in an administrative role, does not require the court to provide it. Instead, the trustee 
or debtor in possession or the creditor will provide or propose a protection method. If the 
party that is affected by the proposed action objects, the court will determine whether the 
protection provided is adequate." 11 U.S.C.A. § 361, comment 1 (1979). I need not decide 
whether court approval is required by statute in all cases, however, because the stipulation 
at issue here required court approval as a condition. 
In re Engle, 93 Bankr. 58, 61 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
A seconc.I statutory argument, based on Banlcruptcy Rule 9019, was rejected in In re 
Bramham. Rule 9019 requires notice, hearing, and court approval for a compromise or settle-
ment of a controversy. The court in In re Bramham held that an adequate protection stipulation 
was more of a "vindication of a statutory right" than a settlement and that "something more 
than mere adequate protection of an allowed-secured claim" was required before rule 9019 hear-
ings were required. 38 Bankr. 459, 466 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984). 
91. Proposed Rules, supra note 24, at 105, reprinted at CCCIII. 
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ments. Finally, section III.A.3 analyzes the rule's effectiveness in ad-
dressing these concerns and suggests a revision to rule 4001(d) to 
ensure that unsecured creditors receive adequate notice, and an oppor-
tunity to object, prior to any adequate protection agreement. 
1. The Provisions of Proposed Bankruptcy Rule 4001 
The amendments proposed to Bankruptcy Rule 4001 are designed 
to expand the rule to include motions to prohibit or condition the sale, 
use, or lease of property.92 The rule, as currently worded, addresses 
motions for relief from stay, motions for authorization to use cash col-
lateral, motions to obtain additional credit, and agreements relating to 
any of these motions.93 The current and proposed rules provide a pro-
cedural mechanism that gives creditors notice of various activities con-
cerning the debtor estate and an opportunity to object when the 
activity affects their collateral position. The proposed rule establishes 
an effective notice and hearing system but does not require creditors 
and debtors to use the system for all agreements. 
Subdivision (a)(l) of proposed rule 400194 requires debtors to give 
notice, to the creditors' committee95 or all creditors included on file 
under rule 1007(d),96 of all motions under Code section 362 for relief 
from an automatic stay, and all motions under Code section 363 to 
prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of property. Subdivisions 
(b) and (c) set out similar requirements for motions for authorization 
to use cash collateral and agreements to obtain additional credit. The 
proposed rule allows an exception from the notice or hearing require-
ments for court determination that the debtor must act immediately to 
92. Proposed Rules, supra note 24, at 110, reprinted at CCCVIII. 
93. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rule 4001. 
94. Section (a)(l) provides in full: 
Motion. A motion for relief from an automatic stay provided by the Code or a motion to 
prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of property pursuant to § 363(e) shall be made in 
accordance with Rule 9014 and shall be served on any committee elected pursuant to § 705 
or appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or its authorized agent, or, if the case is a 
chapter 9 municipality case or a chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of un-
secured creditors has been appointed pursuant to § 1102, on the creditors included on the 
list filed pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as the court may direct. 
Proposed Rules, supra note 24, at 105, reprinted at CCCIII. 
95. Section 1102 requires a creditors' committee in Chapter 11. The committee consists of 
persons holding the seven largest unsecured claims against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988). 
The U.S. trustee may appoint other committees. Similarly, under § 705, a creditors' committee 
may be appointed in a Chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 705 (1988). 
96. Bankruptcy Rule 1007(d) requires Chapter 9 and voluntary Chapter 11 debtors to file a 
list of the 20 largest unsecured creditors. In most cases this notice, or notice to the creditors' 
committee, is adequate to protect creditors. More extensive notice requirements may unduly 
burden the debtor. See Tabb, Lender Preference Clauses and the Destruction of Appealability and 
Finality: Resolving a Chapter 11 Dilemma, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 148-54 (1989) (arguing that 
sending initial notice of the case to all interested parties and sending notice of subsequent actions 
to a representative group is adequate to satisfy due process demands). 
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prevent irreparable injury.97 
Subdivision (d) of the current rule addresses agreements establish-
ing adequate protection and related activities including relief from an 
automatic stay, the use of cash collateral, and the obtaining of credit. 
As with subdivision (a), the proposed rule expands subdivision (d) to 
include agreements prohibiting or conditioning the use or disposition 
of property.98 The rules require notice to the creditors' committee or 
all creditors on the rule 1007 list when parties seek court approval for 
any of the above agreements. Court approval is discretionary. If the 
notified creditors fail to file an objection, the court may then enter an 
order approving or disapproving the agreement without holding a 
hearing. Subdivision (d)(4) allows the notice and hearing procedures 
for agreements to be waived if the judge finds that motions previously 
made - for relief from stay, prohibition, or conditioning the use of 
property disposition, obtaining credit, or use of cash collateral - af-
forded creditors reasonable notice of the terms of an agreement subse-
quently made to settle the motion.99 
It should be noted that the proposed rule addresses only motions 
that creditors have filed seeking action by the court or approval of an 
agreement. The rule would still allow debtors and creditors to enter 
into some adequate protection agreements without seeking a formal 
court order or approval. 100 In order to determine whether such pri-
vate agreements should be allowed, it is necessary to look at policy 
concerns raised by private agreements and the effectiveness of the pro-
cedural mechanisms of rule 4001 in addressing these concerns. Rule 
97. 11 U.S.C. app. - Bankruptcy Rules 400l(b)(2) and (c)(2). 
98. Section (d)(l) provides in full: 
Motion; Service. A motion for approval of an agreement (A) to provide adequate protec-
tion, (B) to prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of property, (C) to modify or termi-
nate the stay provided for in § 362, (D) to use cash collateral, or (E) between the debtor and 
an entity that has a lien or interest in property of the estate pursuant to which the entity 
consents to the creation of a lien senior or equal to the entity's lien or interest in such 
property shall be served on any committee elected pursuant to § 705 or appointed pursuant 
to§ 1102 of the Code or its authorized agent, or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case 
or a chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of unsecured creditors has been ap-
pointed pursuant to § 1102, on the creditors included on the list filed pursuant to Rule 
1007(d), and on such other entities as the court may direct. The motion shall be accompa-
nied by a copy of the agreement. 
Proposed Rules, supra note 24, at 108-09, reprinted at CCCVI. 
99. Proposed Rules, supra note 24, at 110. Notice of various adequate protection agreements 
may be included in the information filed in conjunction with the original motions. For example, 
the motion for authority to use cash collateral should include "the nature of the protection to be 
provided those having an interest in the cash collateral." Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules 
- 1987 Amendment, Bankruptcy Rule 4001, reprinted in 11 U.S.C. app. at 257-58. A motion to 
obtain credit should also describe "the protection for any existing interest in the collateral which 
may be affected by the proposed agreement." _Id. at 258. 
100. Many of the agreements between debtors and creditors are subject to notice and hearing 
requirements of other sections of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 363(b), 364(b) (1988). 
Other agreements, such as for a future payment of cash, could be entered into with no notice to 
the unsecured creditors who are affected by the agreement. 
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4001 is important in determining when adequate protection is pro-
vide'd for the purposes of awarding section 507(b) expenses. 
2. Policy and Rule 4001 
Several courts have allowed adequate protection through allow-
ance of administrative expenses when the original adequate protection 
is the result of a private agreement or stipulation between the debtor 
and creditor, or a stipulation subsequently approved by the court.101 
Other courts have required more before awarding a superpriority sta-
tus.102 These courts focus on the potential prejudice to other creditors 
and the impact on the courts' caseloads. A well-defined system of no-
tice and hearing can prevent such prejudice while not unduly burden-
ing the judiciary. This section explores the policy concerns an 
effective notice system must address. 
The most obvious problem presented by private consensual agree-
ments or stipulations is the possibility that the debtor will enter into an 
agreement unfairly benefiting one creditor. A biased agreement is 
more likely in Chapter 11 cases where the debtor may attempt to favor 
one creditor in order to secure a future source of funds. 103 Addition-
ally, in Chapter 11 cases, the seven largest unsecured creditors form a 
creditors' committee that serves as the primary negotiator for the reor-
ganization plan and supervises the debtor.104 In these cases, the possi-
bility exists that the concerns of those creditors on the committee do 
not reflect the concerns of all unsecured creditors. These policy con-
cerns must be balanced with the possibility that the responsibility to 
make a detailed review of all adequate protection agreements could 
result in an increased and potentially overwhelming workload for the 
courts. 
One method of review for consensual adequate protection agree-
ments was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in In re Blehm Land & Cattle 
Co. 105 There, a Chapter 11 case involved a memorandum of agree-
101. In re Cheatham, 91 Bankr. 382 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (consent agreement held valid but risk 
of inadequacy of protection placed on the creditor); In re Becker, 51 Bankr. 975 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1985) (ex parte stipulation assumed to be valid in determining superpriority eligibility); In 
re Callister, 15 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (ex parte stipulations subsequently court-
approved held to be valid). In these cases, the creditors sought superpriorities when the private 
adequate protection agreements failed to protect the creditors' collateral. Except for cases like 
these, where creditors are seeking § 507(b) expenses, private consensual agreements generally are 
not brought to the attention of other creditors. 
102. In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co., 859 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1988) (private adequate protec-
tion agreement must meet certain criteria prior to a grant of administrative expense priority); In 
re B & W Tractor, 38 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (criteria for the review of private 
adequate protection agreements). 
103. Elsewhere in the Code, Congress evidenced its concern that a debtor might act to prefer 
certain creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988). 
104. See.11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l), (b)(l) (1988); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 401, re-
printed at 6357. 
105. 859 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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ment between the debtor and creditor providing for periodic payments 
to the creditor for continued use of the property by the debtor. The 
debtor subsequently defaulted on the payments.106 The trustee argued 
that the creditor was precluded from asserting a section 507(b) claim 
for administrative expenses because the court had not approved the 
memorandum of agreement. The court declared that requiring court 
approval for all adequate protection agreements would deprive the 
bankruptcy courts of fiexibility. 107 Instead, it adopted a rule that any 
agreement brought before the court for enforcement should be sub-
jected to close scrutiny to determine if it met the criteria set forth in a 
previous bankruptcy court case, In re B & W Tractor Co. 108 These 
standards were (1) whether the agreement was inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Bankruptcy Code, (2) whether the conduct of the 
creditor had been inequitable, and (3) whether allowing the agreement 
would produce an inequitable result. 109 These criteria work to limit 
the ability of the debtor and creditor to enter into an agreement which 
is prejudicial to other creditors by forcing the court to look at the 
agreement both in light of the Code and its effect on other creditors. 
This method of review, however, fails to provide adequate protec-
tion for creditors not party to the agreements because these agree-
ments are reviewed only when challenged by the protected creditor 
who discovers that the protection provided is inadequate. Private un-
approved agreements that do provide adequate protection are never 
brought to the court's attention and therefore would never be subject 
to the review established by the court. Other creditors would never 
know of the agreement or have sufficient information to bring the 
agreement before the court. This is troubling because these agree-
ments have been carried out to the advantage of the contracting par-
ties, and the impact on the other creditors might be of special concern. 
The court in In re Callister articulated several advantages of al-
lowing creditors and debtors to negotiate freely their own agreements 
and stipulations. Although the court was addressing a stipulation that 
had been subsequently approved by the court, the arguments 
presented are also applicable to all types of consensual agreements. 
The court argued that stipulations 
show cooperation between creditors and the estate which should be re-
quited. They reduce costs otherwise incurred in litigation and permit a 
constructive allocation of resources. They lessen the judicial burden of 
administering the estate, an important principle of the Reform Act .... 
106. In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co., 71 Banlcr. 818, 820-21 (D. Colo. 1987). 
107. 859 F.2d at 140. The court in Blehm relied on the flexibility discussed by Congress 
when adopting the Code. Congress was concerned with the flexibility to adapt the provision of 
adequate protection "to varying circumstances and changing modes of financing." HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 339, reprinted at 6295. 
108. 38 Banlcr. 613 (Banlcr. E.D.N.C. 1984). 
109. 38 Banlcr. at 617. 
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[M]ost authorities have assumed that a court order under 11 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 362(d)(l) is essential for relief under 507(b). These authorities may 
be incorrect since 507(b) speaks in terms of the trustee not the court 
providing adequate protection, and this is consistent with the legislative 
history to 361.110 
While cooperation between the debtor and creditor should be en-
couraged, the objectives of reducing cost, lessening judicial burdens, 
and preventing prejudice are best accomplished when notice is re-
quired prior to the validation of any adequate protection agreement. 111 
Prior notice ensures that all adequate protection agreements have a 
chance to be reviewed by other creditors. Once creditors have been 
notified, the court and debtor should be entitled to rely on the silence 
of the other creditors. These creditors were given an opportunity to 
object to the provisions and cannot subsequently complain about the 
prejudicial relationship of the agreements. This prevents the court 
from having to review the agreement subsequently and thereby 
reduces judicial costs. The next section of this Note, III.A.3, analyzes 
whether proposed rule 4001 establishes an adequate notice and hear-
ing system. 
3. Effectiveness of Rule 4001 
In order for the procedural mechanisms established in rule 4001 to 
be considered effective they must create a system which provides for 
adequate review of agreements without unduly burdening the courts 
or the creditors. This section shows that the proposed rule does meet 
these requirements when the parties to the agreement make a motion 
for court approval. The rule fails to protect all creditors, however, by 
omitting notice and hearing procedures for all adequate protection 
agreements. This section concludes that in order for the rule to pro-
tect effectively against unfair and prejudicial agreements, the rule 
should be amended to cover all adequate protection agreements be-
tween the. debtor and any creditor. 
The system of notice provided by proposed rule 4001 gives credi-
tors the option of policing proposed agreements themselves in order to 
protect their interests. Under this system, a bankruptcy court is not 
obligated to undertake subsequent reviews of completed contracts 
since it will be entitled to rely on creditors' diligence in objecting 
within the fifteen days provided and treating failure to object as a 
waiver of rights. The individual creditors and the creditors' commit-
tee have an increased responsibility to review proposed agreements for 
110. 15 Bankr. 521, 531-32 (Bankr. Utah 1981) (footnotes omitted). 
111. Code§ 1109(b) allows a party in interest to be heard on any issue. Collier notes that a 
rule requiring "a right to notice of all steps taken in the reorganization ••• would result in much 
unwarranted difficulty and expense." 5 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 1109.02 [3] (15th ed. 1979) 
(quoted in In re Phillips, 29 Bankr. 391, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). Here, only notice of adequate 
protection agreements is being advocated, not notice of all actions by the debtor. 
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adequate protection, conditioned sale, use, or lease of land, and mo-
tions to obtain credit to ensure that the debtor deals fairly with all 
parties. 
The justification for the system of notice proposed by rule 4001 
rests in part on the assumption that notice to the creditors' committee 
serves as adequate notice to all creditors. Professor Charles Tabb, in 
his article on lender preference clauses, argues that the creditors' com-
mittee is an effective representative body, and notice to the committee, 
after initial notice of the petition to all creditors, satisfies due process 
requirements.112 The notice and hearing procedures for adequate pro-
tection agreements serve primarily to afford unsecured creditors a 
chance to reject agreements which unfairly affect their position. No-
tice to the committee will address this concern and has been found 
adequate by at least one bankruptcy court.113 The other creditors 
must remain diligent in monitoring the creditors' committee's actions 
and require the committee to take an active role in the reorganization 
process.114 This review, with the committee's opportunity to object 
through a formal hearing procedure, reduces the likelihood of unfair 
agreements. 
The proposed rule also will reduce court costs and strains on court 
dockets since agreements can be negotiated and presented to the court 
and to other creditors in final form. Costs also will be reduced since 
courts may assume the validity of agreements unless objections are 
made within the required time. Finally, the court's workload will be 
lessened since hearings are held only when creditors object to an ade-
quate protection provision.115 This prevents the subsequent review of 
agreements as advocated by the court in In re B & W Tractor Co. 116 
Subdivision (d)(4) in rule 4001 also lessens costs since additional no-
tice of an adequate protection agreement is not required when original 
motions concerning debtor action provide adequate information to 
creditors. 
A final argument for requiring notice and hearing prior to an ade-
quate protection agreement is based on the fifth amendment constitu-
tional protection of property, on which the concept of adequate 
112. Tabb, supra note 96, at 148-54. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
113. In re Photo Promotion Assoc., 53 Bankr. 759, 762-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
114. Section 1102 contains several provisions designed to ensure that all creditors receive 
adequate representation in negotiations with the debtor. Section 1102(a) authorizes the court "to 
appoint such additional committees as are necessary to assure adequate representation of credi-
tors •••• " HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 401, reprinted at 6357. Section 1102(c) "authorizes 
the court, on request of a party in interest, to change the size or the membership of a creditors' 
•.. committee if the membership of the committee is not representative of the different kinds of 
claims or interests to be represented." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 401, reprinted at 6357. 
115. Rule 400l(d)(3) provides that "[i]f no objection is filed, the court may enter an order 
approving or disapproving the agreement without conducting a hearing." 11 U.S.C. app. -
Bankruptcy Rule 400l(d)(3). 
116. 38 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984); see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
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protection is based.117 Before any person's property is taken, due pro-
cess must be provided. This right was recognized by the court in In re 
Blumer. 11s The court refused to uphold a deed of trust the debtor 
entered into under section 364. The court's refusal was based on the 
right of the other creditors to notice under section 364(e) and under 
the Constitution. The court noted that "unsecured creditors are enti-
tled to procedural due process" when their rights are affected. 119 This 
constitutional argument provides a final justification for a right al-
ready firmly grounded in policy. 
Rule 4001 provides for notice of most types of adequate protection 
agreements with which other creditors would be concerned. Any no-
tice of motions involving the use of cash collateral or the obtaining of 
credit is sent to the representative creditor group. If the proposed 
amendment is accepted, notice of a motion to use, lease, or sell prop-
erty would also be sent. Notice of these motions, as well as the notice 
required under Code sections 362(a), 363(b), and 364(b), ensures that 
unsecured creditors are informed of almost all adequate protection 
agreements affecting them. Some agreements, however, such as an 
agreement for a future payment of cash, may not fall under the notice 
requirements mentioned above. Thus, rule 4001 fails because it does 
not result in a uniform system of notice and hearing under which un-
secured creditors are notified of all actions affecting the debtor's over-
all ability to pay unsecured creditors. 
A uniform system of notice and hearing can be developed by re-
writing rule 4001 to require standard notice and hearing procedures 
for all adequate protection agreements. This would establish uniform-
ity in the system, and creditors would know to provide notice for all 
agreements and could make certain assumptions about assets for 
which no notice had been given. This requirement would appear ap-
propriate in light of Congress' desire to reduce judicial administra-
tion, 120 yet would still ensure fair agreements. Uniformity would also 
be established firmly in the determination of when the provision of 
adequate protection actually occurs for purposes of a section 507(b) 
allowance. 121 If the amendment to section 507(b), as suggested in Part 
II, is adopted, a uniform definition of an adequate protection "re-
117. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V; see supra note 8. 
118. 66 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986), affd., 826 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1987). 
119. 66 Bankr. at 114; see In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985). 
120. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 339, reprinted at 6296 (Section 361 frequently 
should result in "negotiation between the parties. Only if they cannot agree will the court be-
come involved."). 
121. By requiring that notice of an adequate protection agreement be sent to a representative 
group of other creditors, there can be no dispute about when adequate protection was provided 
to a creditor. This helps to document when adequate protection is provided for purposes of 
§ 507(b) administrative expense requests. 
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quest" would also need to be adopted. The next section of this Note, 
111.B, discusses the formulation of this definition. 
B. Requesting Adequate Protection 
If section 507(b) of the Code were amended, as suggested in Part 
II, to require only that the creditor take the affirmative actions re-
quired under sections 362 and 363, entitling her to adequate protec-
tion, 122 it must be determined what actions by the creditor constitute a 
"request." Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Rules contain de-
tailed procedures outlining a request for adequate protection. Most of 
the court decisions discussing adequate protection requests do so in 
connection with adequate protection valuation and depreciation. The 
cases suggest that only those requests made directly to the court 
should be considered. This rule avoids prejudicing either the debtor or 
the creditor and minimizes court time in determining when a request 
was made. Several relevant concerns are best articulated in decisions 
seeking to determine adequate protection valuation. 
Cases concerning adequate protection valuation try to select a date 
from which collateral value will be protected. Creditors prefer early 
dates: for example, the petition date or the date when the request was 
m.ade directly to the debtor. 123 Debtors, on the other hand, should 
seek to have collateral valuation established later in the process, such 
as on the adequate protection hearing date, to decrease awarded dam-
ages. The court in In re Haiflich 124 rejected both arguments and se-
lected the date protection was first sought from the court. 125 The date 
the court selected was the day the creditor filed for relief from the stay 
and, alternatively, adequate protection. The court noted specifically 
that by choosing the date the creditor first requests protection from 
the court, "the Court avoids any unfairness which could result from 
delay by the parties or the Court's calendar."126 The proposed amend-
ment to section 507(b) seeks to avoid this same unfairness. 
The choice of the date of the petition as the valuation date was 
rejected by the court in In re Hinckley. 127 The court feared an "in-
122. Since under § 364 adequate protection is a prerequisite to the grant of additional liens, a 
creditor whose security position is affected by additional liens should not be required to take any 
affirmative action in order to be entitled to adequate protection and, hence, administrative ex-
pense allowance. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
123. E.g., In re Ritz-Carlton ofD.C., Inc., 98 Bankr. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Wilson, 70 
Bankr. 46 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); In re Haiflich, 63 Bankr. 314 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986); In re 
Hinckley, 40 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). 
124. 63 Bankr. 314 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986). 
125. In making this decision the court noted the position taken by Collier: "In the case of an 
adequate protection valuation, the determinative date should be when the protection was first 
sought." 63 Bankr. at 316 (quoting 3 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1l 506.04[2] (15th ed. 1985)). 
126. 63 Bankr. at 316. 
127. 40 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). 
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crease [in] the number of such filings, which would, in turn, multiply 
litigation."128 The court in Hinckley instead based adequate protec-
tion on the collateral value as of the date of the meeting of the credi-
tors.129 In this case, the creditors met several weeks before the 
creditor actually moved for adequate protection. The court held the 
selection of this date to be appropriate since it was the first time the 
creditor informed the debtor they would seek adequate protection. 
Basing the valuation of collateral, or the existence of an adequate 
protection request, on the creditor's first informal request for adequate 
protection, however, may increase litigation costs. The court will be 
forced to decide whether the creditor asserted the right to adequate 
protection at a date earlier than the formal request. In contrast, a 
formal request serves as a concrete example of a creditor's assertion. 
As noted in In re Wilson, 130 the valuation method chosen in In re 
Haiflich has two benefits over other dates that might be selected. 
Although the court in Wilson was attempting to determine the starting 
point for depreciation compensation, these benefits support defining 
"request" as a formal action by the creditor. The Wilson court de-
cided that selecting the date protection is first sought was beneficial 
because "the rule does not reward the creditor for inaction."131 A 
motion for adequate protection clearly shows the creditor asserting 
her right to protection of property. Considering such a motion as a 
"request" for purposes of section 507(b) may increase litigation, 
although, in theory, a creditor would normally file such a motion only 
when she believes her collateral is seriously decreasing in value. This 
increase in filings could be reduced if only good faith requests were 
recognized. This rule also rewards those creditors who carefully mon-
itor their collateral and the debtor's actions to determine when ade-
quate protection is indicated. 
The second advantage enunciated by the Wilson court is that a 
motion "puts the debtor on notice at the time the creditor's motion is 
filed that at a future point in time the collateral will have to be relin-
quished," or adequate protection provided. 132 This same reasoning 
justifies the suggested amendment to section 507(b). Since the debtor 
has been put on notice by the creditor's request, that request should be 
the sole requirement to qualify for an administrative expense allow-
ance. A formal request to the court for protection would guarantee 
128. 40 Banlcr. at 681. 
129. The meeting of the creditors is discussed in § 341 which requires the U.S. Trustee to 
convene and preside over a meeting of the creditors within a reasonable time after the order for 
relief. 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1988). 
130. 70 Banlcr. 46 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1987). 
131. 70 Banlcr. at 48. 
132. 70 Banlcr. at 48. 
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that the debtor was notified. This definition would also lessen the like-
lihood of litigating the issue of when an informal request occurred. 
The two benefits asserted by the Wilson court outweigh any disad-
vantages, such as the potential increase in litigation, from using the 
date of a motion for adequate protection to determine when an ade-
quate protection "request" has occurred. Considering only a formal 
motion for adequate protection as a "request" under the proposed sec-
tion 507(b) amendment establishes a uniform definition of "request." 
This definition would provide certainty to both creditors and debtors 
in determining when a section 507(b) administrative expense allow-
ance is available. 
CONCLUSION 
Adequate protection was designed to ensure the protection of a 
creditor's bargain and property. This protection, however, cannot be 
provided in a way that unfairly benefits that creditor at the expense of 
other creditors of a debtor. In order to prevent prejudicial treatment 
of one creditor, procedural mechanisms for awarding adequate protec-
tion, whether through the methods suggested in section 361 or 
through an administrative expense allowance, are necessary. The 
present provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules fail to establish 
a system which provides effective adequate protection for a creditor 
and safeguards that creditor from unfair adequate protection agree-
ments between the debtor and other creditors. 
The current wording of Code section 507(b) results in the imposi-
tion of an unfair penalty when a request for adequate protection is 
denied, delayed, or ignored. The current section allows superpriority 
status to be given only to those creditors who previously have been 
provided with adequate protection. In order to protect truly a credi-
tor's bargain, and to guarantee the creditor receives the "benefit of his 
bargain," the grant of administrative expenses should be predicated 
only on the request of adequate protection. Such a rule would benefit 
diligent creditors while still affording the debtor the protections pro-
vided by section 507(b) since the request requirement provides the 
debtor with notice. 
The currently proposed rule 4001 can also result in a creditor be-
ing unfairly penalized even if she has monitored a debtor's actions dili-
gently. The rule does not require notice of all agreements between 
creditors and debtors. The provisions of private agreements are of 
special concern to unsecured creditors since they often involve the as-
sets from which such creditors can hope to recover in the case of liqui-
dation. While a system of detailed court review of all agreements is 
undesirable because of tP,e burden this would place on the courts, a 
system of notice to other creditors of all agreements is an effective 
policing mechanism. The creditors would then have a chance to re-
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view all adequate protection agreements and object to those which 
they view as unfair or prejudicial. Such a system would seek to ensure 
that no creditor receives more, at the expense of others, than the bene-
fit of her bargain. 
- Julia A. Goatley 
